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INTERGENERATIONAL DECISION MAKING:
AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE
Theodore P. Seto*
This Article consists of two parts. The first poses a challenge,
which I call "The Pleistocene Dilemma," to all who write on the
normative problems of intergenerational decision making. In analyz-
ing such problems, it is common either to write abstractly or to focus
on relatively short spans of time-at most a few generations. But
many of the most important practical issues we currently face-
resource depletion, for example-have much longer-term conse-
quences. The hypothetical I pose spans some 12,500 years; at stake
are the rise and fall of civilizations. Any credible normative theory
of intergenerational decision making, I contend, must be able to ad-
dress concrete challenges of this scope. Discounted cost-benefit
analysis, the dominant intergenerational decision-making model in
use today, fails this challenge miserably, as does one of the most po-
litically correct approaches to its implementation, reliance on free
markets.
The second Part of this article introduces the perspective of evo-
lutionary theory. I am in the process of developing an evolutionary
theory of motivation and normative obligation, to be laid out more
fully in a longer article that, unfortunately, will not appear until after
this Symposium issue has been published.1 One of its premises is that
all normative claims are motivational: When we say "you should do
x" or "we should do y," we are attempting to motivate our audience
* Professor of Tax Law, Loyola Law School of Los Angeles. I wish to
acknowledge the enormously helpful research assistance of Abraham Cook and
Christine Ghattas and the comments of Professors Robert Benson, Robert
Chang, Lisa Ikemoto, Kurt Lash and Georgene Vairo on drafts of this paper. I
want especially to thank my wife, Professor Sande Buhai, for her insight and
patience. This paper owes much to her thinking about the issues discussed and
the organizational problems presented. All errors, of course, are mine alone.
1. See Theodore P. Seto, An Evolutionary Theory of Motivation and Nor-
mative Obligation (forthcoming).
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to do x or y or to assure our audience that we ourselves are so moti-
vated. Any theory of normative obligation, I assert, must adopt or
include a theory of motivation; conversely, any comprehensive the-
ory of motivation must include a theory of normative obligation.
2
The second Part of this Article will outline, in summary form, the
parts of my theory that relate to normative obligation and explore
some of their implications for intergenerational decision making.
One of my conclusions is epistemological-that sometimes the only
way to determine whether a behavior is optimal is by trial and error.
Behavioral ecosystems are at least as complex as biological ecosys-
tems, and we know that small changes in the latter often produce un-
expected results. Nevertheless, the model permits identification of a
long-term normative objective consistent with both evolutionary the-
ory and our intuitions about ethics-to wit, the survival, evolution
and integrative expansion of something I call our "We," that is, the
set of actors to whom our system of ethics applies. Were the deci-
sion-maker in the Pleistocene Dilemma to adopt this long-term ob-
jective, the Article concludes, she would resolve that dilemma cor-
rectly.
I. A CHALLENGE: THE PLEISTOCENE DILEMMA
In his book Guns, Germs, and Steel,3 Jared Diamond offers an
evolutionary account of the gross features of human history. In par-
ticular, he explores why remarkably small numbers of Europeans
were able to defeat and destroy large, well-established Native
American civilizations in short order after Columbus's voyage in
1492.4 We know mechanically how it was done: The Europeans
used the horse and the gun to obtain an immediate military advan-
tage; the diseases they brought then decimated American
2. Philosophy currently does not make such a link. Indeed, discussions of
motivation are commonly labeled "folk psychology" in mainstream Western
philosophy, with presumably intended derogatory overtones. See THE
CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 268-69, 514-15 (Robert Audi ed.,
1995). In this regard, philosophy suffers from a failure to incorporate insights
from other fields. I discuss some of the epistemological problems that may
lead to current philosophical distrust of motivational claims in Part II.B.3 be-
low.
3. JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL (1997).
4. See id. at 67-68.
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populations.5 But why, Diamond asks, did the Europeans have guns,
horses and disease, and not the Americans?
6
His answer makes compelling reading and is not easily summa-
rized. The development of settled human civilization, he suggests,
depended initially on the domestication of edible plants and useful
large mammals. Wheat, barley, sheep, goats, cows, horses, and
donkeys were all fortuitously available in or near southwestern
Asia;8 for this reason, humans first developed fixed settlements there
some 7000 to 10,000 years ago.9 The domestication of large herbi-
vores-and of the horse in particular-made possible rapid advances
in agriculture, mobility, and technology generally.10 It also resulted
in the transmission of disease from animals to humans,1 leading to
repeated plagues in Eurasia and relative immunity to such diseases
on the part of the Eurasian population. 12 The Americas, by contrast,
offered only corn as an edible starch, and the alpaca and llama (two
breeds of a single species) as domesticable large herbivores.' 3 Corn
required substantial modification to become useful as a food crop;
14
the alpaca and llama were and are of limited utility. 15 The Americas
5. See id. at 69-81.
6. See id. at 81.
7. See id. at 86-91.
8. Diamond includes northern Africa in Eurasia for this purpose. See id. at
160-61.
9. See id. at 131-75.
10. See id.
11. Among the human diseases that evolved from diseases of animals are
smallpox (cows and related species), flu (pigs and ducks), tuberculosis (cows),
malaria (birds), measles (cows), and cholera and AIDS (monkeys), all of which
have had devastating effects on human populations. See id. at 196-97, 207.
12. See id. at 205-14.
13. See id. at 354-57.
14. See id. at 137.
15. See id. at 355. The alpaca and llama are used for meat, wool, hides, and
the transport of goods. They are not useful, however, for the production of
milk, riding, or pulling vehicles or plows. See id. Diamond argues that, in fa-
cilitating the development of civilization, the five most important herbivorous
domestic mammals were the sheep, goat, cow, pig, and horse. See id. at 160-
61. The next nine were the Arabian camel, Bactrian camel, alpaca/llama, don-
key, reindeer, water buffalo, yak, Bali cow, and mithan. Of these, none were
indigenous to North America, and only the alpaca and llama were indigenous
to South America. See id. The alpaca and llama were not domesticated in
South America until about 3500 B.C. See id. at 167. Their use remained lim-
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thus provided a relatively meager biological base. It was for this rea-
son, Diamond argues, that American civilizations developed much
later and more slowly 16 and posed no substantial biological threat to
the invading Europeans. 17
But why were there no other domesticable large herbivores in
the Americas? After all, at the end of the Pleistocene Era, some
13,000 years ago, the Americas hosted an abundance of large mam-
malian species, including the horse, several species of camel, and
many other possibly domesticable large herbivorous mammals. 18 The
answer is not clear. 19 We do know that humans began arriving in
large numbers at about that time-traversing the frozen waters of the
Bering Strait.20 Coincident with this human invasion, about eighty
percent of the Americas' large mammalian species, including the
horse and camel, became extinct.2' These so-called "Pleistocene ex-
tinctions" may have been caused by human hunting, climatic change,
or a combination of the two.22 My hypothetical asks the reader to
ited to a "small area of the Andes and the adjacent Peruvian coast." Id. at 355.
16. See id. at 362-63. Thus, domestication of plants occured in the Fertile
Crescent around 8500 B.C., South and Central America around 3000 B.C., and
North America around 2500 B.C.; domestication of large herbivores occurred
in the Fertile Crescent around 8000 B.C., South America around 3500 B.C.,
Central America around 500 B.C., and North America post-Columbus; use of
copper or bronze tools occurred in the Fertile Crescent around 4000 B.C.,
South America around 1000 A.D., and Central and North America post-
Columbus; and widespread use of iron tools occurred in the Fertile Crescent
around 900 B.C., and the Americas only post-Columbus. See id.
17. See id. at 357-58.
18. See id. at 162. I use here the calibrated radiocarbon datings given by
Diamond. See id. at 96-97.
19. A review of the literature on this issue appears in Anthony J. Stuart,
Mammalian Extinctions in the Late Pleistocene of Northern Eurasia and North
America, 66 BIOLOGICAL REVIEWS 453 (1991).
20. See DIAMOND, supra note 3, at 44-45.
21. See id. at 213. The larger the species, the more likely it was to become
extinct; for this reason, the percentage of species eliminated depends on the
weight cutoff used. See Stuart, supra note 19, at 455. Many of these North
American species had no exact counterparts in Eurasia. See DIAMOND, supra
note 3, at 167, 213. We therefore do not know whether they would have been
domesticable or whether they would have carried diseases that might have
evolved into human diseases.
22. See DIAMOND, supra note 3, at 46-48; Stuart, supra note 19, at 456.
Diamond argues that similar extinctions occurred at the time of the first human
invasion of Australia as well, leading to similar biological impoverishment.
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assume that human hunting contributed significantly to the extinc-
tions and, therefore, ultimately to the Native American holocaust.
By posing this hypothetical, I do not mean to accuse Native Ameri-
cans of having been responsible for their own near annihilation.
23
Solely for purposes of creating a useful thought experiment, how-
ever, I do ask the reader to consider the possibility of a causal link
between Pleistocene hunting and the European victory 12,500 years
later. Here, then, is the Pleistocene Dilemma:
You are a decision-maker for the first Americans. Assume
that you have only two choices-to limit your people's
hunting or not. If you limit their hunting, some significant
number will starve to death. In the long run, however, their
descendants will domesticate the horse and other large
mammals and develop civilizations better able to resist or
absorb the coming European invasion. If, on the other
hand, you impose no hunting limits, your people will be
substantially better off in the short run-perhaps for many
generations-but their culture will develop more slowly.
As a result they will suffer cultural and physical near-
annihilation some 12,500 years hence.
The Dilemma presents a relatively straightforward problem of
resource use. Should we deplete a particular resource-in this case,
the horse-today, or save it for possible future use? Any credible
normative theory of intergenerational decision making must either
(1) lead to a decision to limit hunting or (2) justify the deliberate
choice of long-term catastrophe. The only questionable assumption
the Dilemma makes is informational. Critics may assert that we can
never know the long-term consequences of our actions. I address
this issue in Part I.B.3 below. Apart from objections on informa-
tional grounds, however, the Dilemma poses a fair and concrete
See DIAMOND, supra note 3, at 42-44.
23. Indeed, preconquest Amerindian culture expressed far more concern for
consequences to future generations than most. The Great Law of the Six Na-
tions Confederacy (Iroquois) stated, in part: "In all our deliberations, we must
be mindful of the impact of our decisions on the seven generations to follow
ours." John Rohe, Conservation in Northern Michigan, 78 MICH. B.J. 424
(1999); see Paul Boudreaux, Environmental Costs, Benefits, and Values: A Re-
view of Daniel A. Farber's Eco-Pragmatism, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 159
n.211 (1999).
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question that credible theories of intergenerational decision making
ought to be able to answer.
Cost-benefit analysis, the formal intergenerational decision-
making approach most commonly used today, fails this challenge.
2 4
Implicitly utilitarian, it converts all costs and benefits (including
lives lost) into dollar amounts, discounts future costs and benefits to
present value using an appropriate discount rate, and selects the
course of action with the highest resulting net benefit or lowest re-
sulting net cost.25 A positive discount rate always results in less
weight being given to future consequences than to present costs and
benefits-the higher the discount rate, the lower the weight given to
the future.26 U.S. courts and administrative bodies typically use rates
of between five percent and fifteen percent; lower rates are used only
by specific congressional mandate and negative rates are never
used.
2 7
Even at a discount rate ofjust one percent, however, cost-benefit
analysis asserts that a decision that would have saved a single life
24. A valuable collection of perspectives on cost-benefit analysis appears in
the June 2000 issue of the Journal of Legal Studies. See generally Sympo-
sium, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 837 (2000) (presenting various perspectives on cost-benefit
analysis) [hereinafter "Cost-Benefit Symposium"].
25. See generally Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 931 (2000) (providing an in-depth discussion of cost-benefit
analysis as a general discipline).
26. See Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Fu-
ture: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L.
REv. 267, 279 (1993).
27. In Johnston v. Davis, for example, the Tenth Circuit held that a 3.25%
rate mandated by statute for specified purposes was unrealistically low and
therefore required recalculation of other important long-term costs and benefits
using a rate of 7.125%. Johnston v. Davis, 698 F.2d 1088 (10th Cir. 1983); see
also N. Cal. Power Agency v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 37 F.3d 1517,
1523 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding the use of a 15% discount rate); Trevino v.
United States, 804 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that the trial
court's use of a negative discount rate was abuse of discretion). For general
discussions of the problem of discount rates see Farber & Hemmersbaugh, su-
pra note 26; Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 39 (1999); Edward R. Morrison, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used
in Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65 U. Cm. L. REv. 1333 (1998); Richard
L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Dis-
counting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999).
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12,500 years ago would have been normatively required even if it re-
sults in wiping out 1054 (one followed by fifty-four zeros) lives to-
day.28 Most of us have no intuitive grasp of numbers of this magni-
tude. The following may place this assertion in perspective.
Astronomers believe that the universe contains over 1022 (one fol-
lowed by twenty-two zeros) stars.29 Assume that every star in the
universe supports a population of intelligent beings equal to that of
Earth (roughly six billion).30 On this assumption, cost-benefit analy-
sis using a one percent discount rate concludes that the saving of one
life 12,500 years ago would justify the wiping out of all intelligent
life in the universe today not just once, but more than one billion tril-
lion times. In the Pleistocene Dilemma, of course, the immediate
benefit from unlimited hunting is much greater and the future harm
much smaller; clearly, therefore, cost-benefit analysis would require
continued unlimited hunting. Apart from saying "But we sure had
fun in the meantime," utilitarianism does little to justify the resulting
holocaust.
Reliance on free markets to make the decision is equally prob-
lematic. The philosophy that free markets produce normatively op-
timal results-which I will call "normative market theory"--is a
product of the same branch of utilitarianism that underlies cost-
benefit analysis. Descriptively, market theory asserts that in an effi-
ciently functioning market with fully internalized costs and benefits,
individual decision makers will rationally apply cost-benefit analysis
to all of their decisions using the marginal real rate of return on capi-
tal, currently estimated to be about twelve percent, 3 1 as their discount
rate. The normative branch of this theory further asserts that the out-
comes of such decisions are normatively optimal because they
maximize aggregate welfare as expressed through preferences
28. See Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 26, at 277-79.
29. See Paul J. Green, Star, in 18 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 840,
840 (2000).
30. The human population of the planet Earth was estimated to be 6.1 bil-
lion in 2000 and is projected to be about 9.1 billion in 2050. See THE WORLD
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 860, 860 (2001).
31. See Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY, SIXTH SERIES: JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE
GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 144, 144 (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds.,
1992).
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satisfied in the market.32 Although it would be next to impossible to
determine the marginal real rate of return on capital in the Americas
for each of the past thirteen millennia, there is no reason to believe
that the actual decision made by Native Americans (by hypothesis,
not to limit hunting) was other than rational and unconstrained. Un-
der normative market theory, it follows that that decision must have
been utility maximizing and therefore normatively correct. 33 Thus,
reliance on free markets to resolve the Pleistocene Dilemma would
also have resulted in continued unlimited hunting with the same ab-
sence of'justification for the outcome.
II. EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES
A. An Evolutionary Theory of Motivation and Normative Obligation
Evolution is often misunderstood. At its core, it has nothing to
do with biology, even though it is essential to modem biology. It is
simply a process-a process that can apply to all sorts of things,
genes among them.34 In order to be subject to evolution, a set of
32. Richard Epstein, for example, asserts that in general, so long as regula-
tion prevents aggression and coordinates use of common pools, all other out-
comes are inferior to that which will be produced by unconstrained markets.
See Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, in PHILOSOPHY,
POLITICS, AND SOCIETY, supra note 31, at 84, 85.
33. In effect, normative market theory claims that unless (1) costs and bene-
fits were not fully internalized, (2) markets were not efficient, or (3) govern-
ment was involved, then whatever actually happens is the best of all possible
worlds. See id.
34. For example, mathematicians use evolution deliberately to solve prob-
lems not amenable to conventional solutions; they call this process the "genetic
algorithm." See, e.g., Mitchell A. Potter & Kenneth A. De Jong, A Coopera-
tive Coevolutionary Approach to Function Optimization, in PARALLEL
PROBLEM SOLVING FROM NATURE-PPSN III: INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION, THE THIRD CONFERENCE ON PARALLEL
PROBLEM SOLVING FROM NATURE JERUSALEM, ISRAEL, OCTOBER 9-14, 1994
PROCEEDINGS 249 (Yuval Davidor et al. eds., 1994); R. Chandrasekharam et
al., Genetic Algorithm for Node Partitioning Problem and Applications in
VLSI Design, 140 COMPUTERS & DIGITAL TECHNIQUES 255, 255 (1993);
David Goldberg, Genetic and Evolutionary Algorithms Come of Age, 37
COMM. ACM 113, 113-14 (1994); Kenneth V. Price, Genetic Annealing, 19
DR. DOBBS J.: SOFTWARE TOOLS FOR THE PROFESSIONAL PROGRAMMER 127,
127 (1994). See generally JOHN HOLLAND, ADAPTATION IN NATURAL AND
ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS (MIT Press ed. 1992) (1971) (discussing theoretical
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phenomena need only meet three criteria. (1) First, the phenomena
must reproduce, and they must survive and reproduce differentially
in response to a common set of environmental conditions. All this
means is that some members of the population must do better than
others in dealing with those conditions. The more successful ones
will produce more offspring in the next generation. As a result, the
character of the population as a whole will change over time. (2)
Second, the phenomena must reproduce imperfectly. Otherwise,
evolution will be limited to characteristics that were present in the
first generation and no new characteristics will ever develop. (3)
Third, such imperfect reproduction must not systematically disfavor
adaptive changes; if it did, it might offset the effects of the first two.
If these three criteria are met and environmental conditions are rela-
tively stable, the law of evolution states that the population of such
phenomena will, with a probability approaching infinity, become bet-
ter adapted to those conditions.
3 5
foundations and exploring applications of genetic algorithms in the study of
complex adaptive systems). Drug companies now use an analogous process,
called computer-aided molecular design (CAMD), to design new drugs. See
Michael J. Felton, Survival of the Fittest in Drug Design, 3 MODERN DRUG
DiscovERY 49, 49 (2000). Companies of all sorts are using a similar process,
called directed molecular evolution, to develop detergents, crops, and other
products. See Andrew Pollack, Selling Evolution in Ways Darwin Never Imag-
ined; If You Can Build a Better Gene, Investors May Come, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
28, 2000, at Cl. Indeed, three corporations specializing in this process have
gone public this past year. See id. Some of the most dangerous computer vi-
ruses use evolution to avoid detection and eradication. See Peter E. Sakkas,
Espionage and Sabotage in the Computer World, 5 INT'L J. OF INTELLIGENCE
& COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 155, 158 (1990). Gerald Edelman has even pro-
posed that human learning results from selection among neuronal groups. See
GERALD M. EDELMAN, NEURAL DARWINIsM: THE THEORY OF NEURONAL
GROUP SELECTION, 303-08 (1987).
35. More precisely, evolution is a process of directional change that oper-
ates on any phenomena that meet three criteria: (1) such phenomena survive or
reproduce differentially in response to a common set of environmental condi-
tions, (2) they reproduce imperfectly, and (3) adaptive imperfections in their
reproduction are not systematically disfavored. If these three criteria are met
and environmental conditions are relatively stable, the law of evolution states
that the population of such phenomena will, over time, become better adapted
to the environmental conditions it faces. For purposes of this definition, an en-
vironmental condition is a condition external to the phenomena in question that
affects their survival or reproduction; it is relatively stable if it does not change
as fast as evolution operates; a characteristic is adaptive if such phenomena are
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Genetic evolution operates primarily at the level of the gene, not
the level of the individual or group.36 What this means is that over
time, genes are favored if they survive and reproduce more success-
fully; their human or other carriers need not survive.37 While the in-
terests of genes can thus diverge from those of their individual carri-
ers, this is more commonly the exception than the rule.38 All else
being equal, a gene that systematically kills its carrier is less likely to
be successful than one that keeps its carrier alive and reproducing.
39
In the context of intergenerational decision making, such possible di-
vergences in interest do not appear to be important. This Article will
more likely to survive and reproduce successfully with that characteristic than
without it; and phenomena are said to become better adapted to the environ-
mental conditions they face if an increasing portion of the population of such
phenomena have adaptive characteristics. The foregoing is merely a general-
ized restatement of Fischer's Fundamental Law of Natural Selection. See
DANIEL L. HARTL, A PRIMER OF POPULATION GENETICS (3d ed. 1999).
Unfortunately, no generally accepted nomenclature exists for this proc-
ess in all of its manifestations. Using it to explain the development of living
species, Darwin called the process "natural selection," analogizing it to the "ar-
tificial" process used by animal breeders. CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF
SPECIES 67-107 (Gillian Beer ed., Oxford World's Classics 1988) (1859). Bi-
ologists sometimes further distinguish between "natural" and "sexual" selec-
tion, using the former to refer to selection in favor of survival characteristics,
and the latter to refer to selection in favor of characteristics that give advan-
tages in mating. See, e.g., GEOFFREY MILLER, THE MATING MIND: How
SEXUAL CHOICE SHAPED THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE (2000); Helena
Cronin, Sexual Selection: Historical Perspectives, in KEYWORDS IN
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 286 (Evelyn Fox Keller & Elisabeth A. Lloyd eds.,
1992); Hamish G. Spencer & Judith C. Masters, Sexual Selection: Contempo-
rary Debates, in KEYWORDS IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, supra at 294.
Mathematicians, who use the process deliberately, call it the "genetic algo-
rithm." See Lawrence Davis & Martha Steenstrup, Genetic Algorithims and
Simulated Annealing: An Overview, in GENETIC ALGORITHMS AND
SIMULATED ANNEALING 1, 1-2 (Lawrence Davis ed., 1987); Chandraskharam
et al., supra note 34, at 255. Yet other disciplines use other names. The lay
world, oblivious to these distinctions, continues to call the process "evolution."
Because no current technical term is sufficiently inclusive and because I be-
lieve the lay term to be less confusing to this article's intended audience, I call
the process "evolution."
36. See Arthur Robinson, Genetics and Heredity, in 19 NEW
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 700, 700 (Philip W. Goetz et al. eds., 15th ed.
1988).
37. See id. at 721-22.
38. See id. at 720-21.
39. See id.
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therefore, for the most part, treat the interests of the gene and its in-
dividual carrier as identical. Genes cause their carriers to develop
specific attributes; those attributes are known as "phenotypes., 40 Bi-
ologists often speak of phenotypes evolving; this article will too.
My theory of motivation begins with genetically-triggered be-
haviors. Consider, for example, the behavior of drinking water in re-
sponse to thirst. Some gene produces the biochemical mechanism
that makes us feel thirsty. We may not be able to identify that gene,
nor may we understand the mechanism. We can, however, speak in-
telligently about why that mechanism evolved. Humans need water
to survive. We therefore need some mechanism to motivate us to
drink. Individuals who have such a mechanism are better adapted to
their circumstances than those who do not. They are therefore more
likely to survive and reproduce, reproducing in the process the rele-
vant gene. In the long run evolutionary theory predicts that the hu-
man population should become dominated by individuals who feel
thirst when their bodies need water.
Evolution applies to learned behaviors as well.41 Like genes,
learned behaviors are transmitted from individual to individual, al-
though the mechanism may not always be clear. We know that be-
haviors are transmitted through imitation, instruction and evangel-
ism; other mechanisms may also exist. Regardless of how
40. HARTL, supra note 35, at 2.
41. This is not a new claim, although my phrasing may be unconventional.
In his 1976 book, The Selfish Gene, Dawkins suggested that "memes," which
he defined alternatively as units of cultural transmission or units of imitation,
might be subject to evolution just like genes. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE
SELFISH GENE 206-07 (1976). Others have since explored this suggestion at
greater length. See, e.g., SUSAN BLACKMORE, THE MEME MACHINE (1991);
RICHARD BRODIE, VIRUS OF THE MIND: THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE MEME
(1996); DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED (1991); DANIEL C.
DENNETr, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA (1995); AARON LYNCH, THOUGHT
CONTAGION: How BELIEF SPREADS THROUGH SOCIETY (1996). Unfortu-
nately, there is as yet no consensus as to what a "meme" is. Most commonly,
the term refers to an undefined set of which "idea" is one of the principal sub-
sets. Some imply that virtually everything we know is a meme. Blackmore
disagrees, asserting, for example, that the learned behavior of riding a bicycle
is generally the result of operant conditioning, not the operation of memes. See
BLACKMORE, supra note 41, at 45. I use the term to mean simply any non-
genetic mechanism that produces learned behavior-in effect, the genotype of
which the learned behavior is the phenotype.
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transmission occurs, however, learned behaviors clearly do pass from
one human carrier to another.42 In other words, they reproduce.
Their survival and reproduction, moreover, meet all three criteria for
application of the law of evolution.43 (1) Like genes, learned behav-
iors survive or reproduce differentially in response to environmental
conditions."4 Indeed, one of the avowed purposes of law is to influ-
ence the survival and reproduction of learned behaviors by shaping
the environmental conditions their human carriers face; law often
seeks to extinguish some learned behaviors and encourage others.
(2) The reproduction of learned behaviors is imperfect, as any parent
or teacher will attest. And (3) there is no evidence that adaptive im-
perfections are systematically disfavored. It follows that learned be-
haviors, like genes, evolve.
The motivation of learned behaviors is somewhat more complex
than that of genetically programmed behaviors. It is not true, as
economists sometimes assume, that we behave as we do because it is
in our self-interest to do so.45  We are not consciously "fitness
maximizers"--that is, we do not decide how to behave by explicit
reference to whether behaviors help us survive and reproduce. Our
sense of self-that is, our preference for our own survival-often
motivates us directly to attempt to survive. But other genetic motiva-
tors are less direct. For example, we are genetically motivated to
seek pleasure and avoid pain. Not coincidentally, our bodies are
hard-wired to give us pleasure when we engage in sexual intercourse.
Intercourse, of course, helps us reproduce. But intercourse is not our
only path to pleasure. We may also gain pleasure through entertain-
ment, achievement, power, or other means. Learned behaviors take
advantage of the indirect nature of genetic motivations, redirecting
their emotional energy away from their original functions, a process
that psychologists call "sublimation., 46 By their very nature, there-
fore, learned behaviors involve at least some diversion from the
42. See, e.g., DAWKINS, supra note 41, at 205-06.
43. See BLACKMORE, supra note 41, at 14-16; see also HARTL, supra note
35, at 59-98 (explaining the causes of evolution).
44. See DAWKINS, supra note 41, at 213-14.
45. See, e.g., THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSPHY, supra note 2, at
292 (discussing how individual choice can create deficient outcomes in the
context of game theory).
46. See, e.g., J. TREVOR DAVIES, SUBLIMATION (1947).
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immediate tasks of individual survival and reproduction. Neverthe-
less, evolutionary theory posits that, like individuals with adaptive
genes, individuals who carry adaptive learned behaviors are likely to
come to dominate the population as a whole. (Again, this article will
ignore problems created by any possible divergence between the
evolutionary interests of the behavior and those of its individual car-
rier.)
47
Indeed, regardless of whether behavior is learned or genetically
programmed, under evolutionary theory, the simplest explanation is
always that we are motivated to behave as we do because such be-
haviors are or have been adaptive.48 If a particular behavior is in our
objective self-interest, evolutionary pressure will exist for a mecha-
nism motivating that behavior to evolve.4 9 If it is in our objective
self-interest to drink water, evolutionary pressure will exist for us to
evolve thirst, which motivates us to drink. Similarly, if it is in our
objective self-interest to cooperate, evolutionary pressure will exist
for us to evolve cultural motivating mechanisms that make us feel we
should cooperate. Conversely, the existence of a motivating mecha-
nism creates a presumption that the relevant behavior is in our objec-
tive self-interest. The fact that we feel thirst creates a presumption
that the consumption of water is in our objective self-interest. Not
all animals need supplemental water; those that have no such need do
not drink and presumably do not feel thirst.
As I have noted, this link between self-interest and motivation is
not absolute. I therefore characterize it as a presumption, not a rule.
For reasons founded in evolutionary theory but beyond the scope of
this Article, there are many situations in which genetically pro-
grammed motivations lead to self-destructive behaviors-suicide,
overeating, alcoholism, drug addiction, to name a few.5 ° The fact
that learned behaviors inherently involve some redirection away
from the core tasks of survival and reproduction makes the link even
47. I explore this problem in depth elsewhere. See Seto, supra note 1.
48. See id.
49. See Egbert Giles Leigh, Jr., Levels of Selection, Potential Conflicts, and
Their Resolution: The Role of the "Common Good," in LEVELS OF SELECTION
IN EVOLUTION 15 (Laurent Keller ed., 1999).
50. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in Law and Economics Scholar-
ship, 79 OR. L. REV. 147, 175-76 (2000).
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looser where learning is involved. The presumption that we are mo-
tivated to behave as we do because such behaviors are, or have been,
adaptive is therefore rebuttable. Nevertheless, the presumption re-
mains. Where a motivation has persisted for a long time, contrary to
apparent self-interest-for example, the desire to be good-
evolutionary theory demands that we either explain that persistence
in evolutionary terms or reexamine our understanding of self-
interest.
51
Why are we motivated to be good? Under evolutionary theory,
the simplest explanation is that we are motivated to be good because
being good is adaptive. 52 But why is it adaptive to be good? The an-
swer is given by iterated game theory. This tells us that in games
like the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, which model non-zero-sum
conflicts of interest with repeated interactions (which is to say, much
of life), cooperative behavior is often optimal.53
In its simplest form, the Prisoner's Dilemma is almost trivial.
Two players each choose between two courses of action, known
conventionally as cooperation ("C") and defection ("D"). Neither
player knows in advance what the other will do. The payoffs for
each player are as follows:
FIGURE 1
player 2
C D
C x,x z,y
player 1
D y,z w,w
where y > x > w > z.54 In each pair of outcomes, the first payoff be-
longs to player 1, the second to player 2.
51. See CHRISTOPHER BOEHM, HIERARCHY IN THE FOREST: THE
EVOLUTION OF EGALITARIAN BEHAVIOR 197-224 (1999).
52. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Pris-
oner's Dilemma, in GENETIC ALGORITHMS AND SIMULATED ANNEALING 32,
38 (Lawrence Davis ed., 1987).
53. See MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 64-66
(1987).
54. See id.
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To make this simpler for the mathematically challenged, Figure
2 illustrates the same game, but substitutes numbers for letter vari-
ables:
FIGURE 2
player 2
C D
C 3,3 1,4
player 1
D 4,1 2,2
Thus, if both players cooperate, each receives 3 points; if they both
defect, each receives 2 points; if player 1 defects and player 2 coop-
erates, player 1 wins 4 points, while player 2 receives only 1.
Note player l's motivations. If player 2 chooses to cooperate,
player 1 is better off defecting (4 > 3). If player 2 chooses to defect,
player 1 is still better off defecting (2 > 1). Indeed, no matter what
player 2 chooses to do, player 1 should defect. And since the play-
ers' situations are symmetrical, an identical calculus applies to player
2. But, if both defect, each will have a payoff of 2; whereas if both
cooperate, they will both be better off-they will each have a payoff
of 3. Of course, if one chooses to cooperate, hoping the other will as
well, then the other may choose to defect, thereby winning 4 rather
than 3; and the cooperator will be worse off. Hence the dilemma.
A different calculus, however, operates if the game is played not
once, but repeatedly-the so-called repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. In
the repeated game, if player 1 cooperates and player 2 defects, player
1 may decide not to cooperate the following game. As a result,
player 2 will be worse off. In other words, although it is in each
player's short-term interest to be uncompromisingly nasty, some
other strategy may work better in the long run.
The mathematics of this type of game is typically studied today
through high-speed computer simulations. Simulations pitting dif-
ferent strategies against each other suggest that many of the most
successful are variations of a strategy known as "tit for tat."55 Tit for
55. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EvOLUTION OF COOPERATION viii (1984);
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tat has three parts: (1) begin by cooperating ("do unto others as you
would have them do unto you"); (2) if the other party defects, punish
immediately ("an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth"); and (3) if he
then responds cooperatively, immediately forgive and return to co-
operation ("forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who tres-
pass against us"). The simulations suggesting this result are, of
course, very crude approximations of reality. My theory assumes,
however, that while more sophisticated approximations may suggest
important refinements, their ultimate conclusions will not be funda-
mentally different.
If this is so, it follows that some of our most fundamental ethical
precepts are mathematically optimal. If adhering to the ethical code
implied by tit for tat is adaptive, evolution should favor the survival
and reproduction of individuals who adhere to such a code.56 It is for
this reason, I suggest, that the first part of tit for tat-some variation
of the Golden Rule-is central to the ethical system of every
major religion in the world. 57 We have all, through trial and error,
ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED
MODELS OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 10-13 (1997); Axelrod, supra
note 52, at 32-33. For a more technical and comprehensive introduction to
game theory generally, see HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING: A
PROBLEM-CENTERED INTRODUCTION TO MODELING STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
(2000).
56. This does not depend on the "players" being rational or intelligent. All
multicellular organisms reflect some measure of cooperation among their con-
stituent parts. More elaborate forms of cooperation can evolve among nonsen-
tient beings. See JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF
GAMES (1982).
57. See in Christianity: Matthew 7:12 (New American) ("Treat others the
way you would have them treat you: this sums up the law and the prophets");
in Judaism: Shabbat 31 a ("What is hateful to you, do not to your fellowmen.
That is the entire Law: All the rest is commentary"); in Islam: Mohammed, in
the Hadith ("Do to all men as you would wish to have done unto you, and re-
ject for others what you would reject for yourselves"); in Confucianism: Ana-
lects of Confucius 15.4 (Confucius was asked, "Is there any single word that
could guide one's entire life?" And he replied, "Should it not be reciprocity?
What would you do not wish for yourself, do not do to other."); in Hinduism:
Mahabharata 5, 1517 ("This is the sum of duty: do naught unto others which
would cause you pain if done to you"); in Buddhism: Udana-Varga 5, 18
("Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful"); in Taoism:
T'AI SHANG KEN YING P'IEN ("Regard your neighbor's gain as your own gain,
and your neighbor's loss as your own loss."); and in Zoroastrianism: Dadis-
tan-i-dinik 94, 5 ("That nature alone is good which refrains from doing unto
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discovered this objective truth and incorporated it in the learned be-
haviors we pass on from generation to generation.
58
My claim, you will recall, is that we are motivated to be good
because behaviors labeled "cooperative" in repeat game theory are
mathematically optimal. Consistent with this claim, I label such be-
haviors "ethical" or "good." (I use these terms interchangeably.) I
do not believe I am misappropriating these terms. Loosely speaking,
I am simply asserting that a behavior is "ethical" or "good" if it is
consistent with the Golden Rule and its enforcement-a premise
fally consistent with the meaning we intuitively assign to these
terms. More formally, I define a behavior as "ethical" if and only if
it is part of the optimal solution to a repeated non-zero-sum game
that approximates the real problem to which it is a response. Note
that my formal definition avoids specification of the game to which
ethical behavior is the optimal solution. This is because even the
most sophisticated repeated non-zero-sum games under study today
are but crude approximations of reality.59 We are not yet able ade-
quately to specify either the relevant game or its optimal solution.
60
Nevertheless, I assume that such a game exists and, further, label its
optimal solution the "principle of reciprocity." Tit for tat, the vari-
ous formulations of the Golden Rule, John Rawl's choice from be-
hind the veil,61 and the classic parental question "How would you
feel if Suzie did that to you?" are all approximations of that princi-
ple.
It follows that ethics is not merely a cultural artifact. In my
model, good and evil exist objectively as part of the mathematics of
our universe. 62 Their implementation, of course, may vary from
another whatsoever is not good for itself.").
58. The premise that cooperative behavior results from the operation of
evolutionary forces has been widely explored by others. See, e.g., BOEHM, su-
pra note 51; ROBERT BOYD & PETER RICHERSON, CULTURE AND THE
EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS (1985); ELLIOT SOBER & DAVID WILSON, UNTO
OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION AND PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR (1998).
59. See THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 2, at
293; TAYLOR, supra note 53, at xii.
60. See id.
61. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (rev. ed. 1999) (1971).
62. Some may accuse me of having committed the "naturalistic fallacy," a
derogatory term that assumes it is inherently wrong to attempt to explain what
ought to be in terms of what is. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLWREVIEW [Vol. 35:235
culture to culture. A behavior consistent with the principle of recip-
rocity in one culture may not be in another because of the cultures'
different overall strategies for dealing with interpersonal relations.
For example, a "white lie" about one's reasons for refusing a request
may be ethically mandatory in one culture but prohibited as dishon-
est in another. Notwithstanding differences in implementation, how-
ever, good and evil are real and susceptible to objective evaluation.
Individuals who ignore the principle of reciprocity tend to live Hob-.
besian lives: nasty, short, and brutish. Goodness is generally adap-
tive.
In the real world, any implementation of the principle of recip-
rocity (an "ethos of reciprocity") is specific to a set of actors who ac-
knowledge that ethos, incorporate it in their behaviors and expect
other members to reciprocate. I will call that set of actors the "We"
of the ethos and those outside the set "Them" or "Others." Pursuant
to the principle of reciprocity, we commonly extend courtesies to
members of our We that we would not extend to Others and expect
reciprocity only from other members of our We. Each of us is nor-
mally a member of multiple We's; each We has its own ethos; each
necessarily excludes a Them. The ethos of reciprocity that operates
within the We of a person's family (e.g., "We the Setos") may re-
quire an individual to undertake duties vis-a-vis family members that
she would not feel compelled to undertake with respect to outsiders
and would not, in turn, expect them to undertake with respect to her
("Of course your kids can stay at my house the week you're in New
York"). The same actor may also consider herself part of a We
HuMAN NATURE 455-76 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1949); GEORGE EDWARD
MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 69-73 (rev. ed. 1993) (stating that good is undefin-
able and that attempts to define it by reference to anything else are
inherently fallacious). See generally THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 2, at 507 (explaining how Moore defined "good");
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 206 (Dagobert P. Runes ed., 1942) (defining
Moore's naturalistic fallacy); A. PRIOR, LOGIC AND THE BASIS OF ETHICS 1
(1949) (discussing Moore's naturalistic fallacy); W.K. Frankena, The Natural-
istic Fallacy, in THEORIES OF ETHICS 50, 50-63 (Philippa Foot ed., 1967) (dis-
cussing "good" in light of Moore's notion of naturalistic fallacy). Although it
is clearly unpersuasive to argue that whatever is, is right, this does not mean
that the normative world is inherently and forever separate from the objective.
The fact that no one yet has built a persuasive bridge does not mean the task is
impossible. To argue otherwise is to assert that whatever is, is inevitable.
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defined by her church ("Our prayers go out to members who are not
able to be here this morning because of illness") or other social unit,
and part of another We defined by her ethnicity ("No daughter of
mine is going to marry one of Them"). In international affairs, some
assert that we should only protect citizens of other countries if doing
so is in our "national interest"--another way of saying we owe pro-
tective duties only to members of We the people of the United States.
One of the current frontiers of ethics is whether our broadest We
should extend beyond the human species.
63
History is, in part, a story of the expansion of We's. From the
tribe to the city-state to the ethnic group to the nation-state to the
species, the set of actors to whom we feel at least some sense of ethi-
cal obligation has over the long run consistently expanded. It has
done so because development of an ethos of reciprocity between
groups otherwise in friction is almost always adaptive. The frictions
that arise between two groups who have not yet formed a single We
are analogous to those that arise between two individuals who have
no ethos of cooperation. In the long run, they hurt both. A Hobbe-
sian international order is no more functional than a Hobbesian nu-
clear family.
The principle of reciprocity, in turn, is fundamental to many
normative values at the core of law. Equality, for example, is a di-
rect corollary. "Do unto others as you would have them do unto
you" necessarily implies equality of ethical status.64 The rule of law
itself is required to solve a fundamental problem in game theory: the
fact that mutual cooperation is not the only possible equilibrium so-
lution.65 The second aspect of tit for tat, for example, requires that
an actor who defects be punished. Both game theory and common
63. See, e.g., ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS (Tom Regan &
Peter Singer eds., 1976); IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS (Peter Singer ed., 1985);
PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LBERATION 1-25 (2d ed. 1990); PETER SINGER,
PRACTICAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1993); PAuL TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE: A
THEORY OF ENvIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1986).
64. More obviously could and should be said of this claim. An adequate
elaboration, however, is well beyond the scope of this paper; I reserve that task
for another time. See Seto, supra note 1.
65. See HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING: A PROBLEM-
CENTERED INTRODUCTION TO MODELING STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 443-50
(2000) (discussing the technical exploration of evolutionary stability).
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sense tell us that punishment by the victim will not always produce a
return to cooperation. It may instead trigger escalating retaliation-
what in real life we sometimes think of as a blood feud. Law at-
tempts to solve this problem by removing the punitive role to a neu-
tral third party-at the very least, to a party not itself having the
same ethical status as ordinary members of the We. 66 In most con-
texts today, this party is the state. In the international arena, collec-
tive action performs a similar function, collectivity itself diminishing
the likelihood of escalation. Also, because law ideally enforces the
principle of reciprocity, its rules must apply equally across all mem-
bers of the We-in Wechsler's terms, it must enforce neutral princi-
ples.67 We are all therefore equal before the law.68
Normative obligation is not, of course, limited to the principle of
reciprocity. There are many things we should do that are at best
ethically neutral: "I should do well in school" or "I should abstain
from sexual intercourse before marriage," for example. Feeling that
one should do something is a form of motivation. How it operates is
not well understood. Its function in my theory, however, is simple.
The adaptivity of many learned behaviors-sharing, for example-
only becomes obvious with extensive experience, sometimes possi-
bly even the experience of many generations. Were we motivated
solely by reason and self-interest, we might never undertake such
behaviors or do so only after painfully inventing the wheel again and
again. The process of socialization, through which basic learned be-
haviors are passed from one generation to the next, facilitates the re-
production of nonobvious but nevertheless adaptive learned behav-
iors. As we are socialized, we "internalize" these behaviors, by
which I mean that we come to feel both a compulsion to perform
66. Michael Taylor explores this issue in his analysis of Hobbes' and
Hume's theories. See MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION:
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 125-79 (1987).
67. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
68. Law can, of course, be used for purposes completely inconsistent with
this statement-for example, to establish and maintain hierarchy. My premise
is not that it cannot be so used, but rather that equal treatment is inherent in the
notion of law itself. Its use for inconsistent purposes generates cognitive dis-
sonance that in turn creates pressure for changes in the law to diminish hierar-
chy.
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them and a discomfort (shame, guilt, or unease) if we fail to do so.
69
Within my theory, therefore, an assertion is normative if it attempts
to cause the internalization of a learned behavior or to invoke a
learned behavior already internalized.7 °
Two conclusions follow. The first is descriptive: a culture's
commonly internalized behaviors (its "norms") represent, in effect,
its accumulated wisdom about adaptivity. 7' The second is normative:
when we assert that a behavior should have normative status, we are
necessarily asserting that such behavior is adaptive-ultimately that
such behavior, however indirectly, will help the entities we care
about survive and reproduce. This shift from the descriptive to the
normative is my theory's critical move. I begin by explaining why
we are motivated to do what is right: we are so motivated because
doing what is right is adaptive; we have therefore evolved mecha-
nisms that motivate us to perform such adaptive behavior; these
mechanisms include norms and their internal and external enforce-
ment. I then assert that this is, in fact, what norms are-that they
have no existence independent of their adaptive function. In making
this essentialist shift, I appeal primarily to Occam's Razor: if the de-
scriptive portion of my theory can explain most important features of
our normative world, there is no reason to postulate an independent
origin for that world.72 Demonstrating that my theory can explain
our most salient norms, of course, will be one of the principal goals
of my forthcoming longer paper.73 Here, I ask the reader to assume
69. For purposes of my theory, the differences among guilt, shame, and
other internal feelings of discomfort are irrelevant.
70. I would further define "morality" as the set of learned behaviors subject
to formal or informal punitive enforcement within a culture. "I should do well
in school" may be normative, but, at least in American culture, it is not an is-
sue of morality. By contrast, at least in some American subcultures, "I should
abstain from sexual intercourse before marriage" is both normative and moral.
71. The fact that a behavior has joined this set and become a norm, of
course, does not mean the norm is still adaptive-or even that it ever was adap-
tive.
72. See, e.g., Francis Heylighen, Occam 's Razor, PRINCIPIA CYBERNETICA
WEB (1995) at http://pespmcl.vub.ac.be/OCCAMRAZ.html (last modified
July 7, 1997) (explaining that the principle of Occam's Razor dictates that "one
should not make more assumptions than the minimum needed").
73. See Seto, supra note 1.
256 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 35:235
the conclusion arguendo: it is possible to test normative assertions
by exploring whether the behaviors they advocate are adaptive.
Adherence to the principle of reciprocity is generally adaptive,
but it is not adaptive-and therefore not normative-in all situations.
In other words, ethics as I have defined it may be normatively subor-
dinate in some contexts. Consider, for example, the moral "thou
shalt not kill."' 74 This clearly implements the principle of reciprocity:
On the whole, we prefer that others not kill us. For this reason, we
limit its application to members of our We-generally, human be-
ings-notwithstanding the apparently unqualified nature of its text.
Even with respect to human beings, both law and ethics generally
recognize an exception for killing in self-defense. 75 This exception is
not necessary for enforcement of the principle of reciprocity itself;
after all, the norm could be enforced by someone other than the vic-
tim. Its existence is better explained by the fact that, when one is
threatened by another intent on murder, survival is more adaptive
than the principle of reciprocity. A norm that required us passively
to allow our own murder would not help us survive and reproduce.
Assigning less than absolute normative status to ethics may
make some uncomfortable, particularly since my theory reserves that
status for adaptivity-sometimes also known as "fitness."76 Fitness,
like evolution, is commonly misunderstood.77 In the lay world, it is
often associated with the ability to dominate, a notion quintessen-
tially captured by the Olympic motto: Citius, Altius, Fortius ("faster,
higher, stronger"). 78  "Survival of the fittest" as a normative goal
seems disturbingly reminiscent of Nazism and the notion that "might
makes right." My theory requires that we reconceptualize fitness.
Fitness is neither strength, nor speed, nor the ability to dominate, nor
74. Exodus 20:13.
75. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1962) (codification of rules justi-
fying killing in self-defense).
76. THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 2, at 581-82.
77. See CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Gillian Beer ed., 1996)
(1897). The second part of Darwin's original title--"or, The Preservation of
Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life"--did not help. Id. at xix (referring to
the original edition of Darwin's book). Unfortunately, even biologists have not
yet agreed on a formal definition. See John Beatty, Fitness: Theoretical Con-
texts, in KEYWORDS IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 115 (Evelyn Fox Keller &
Elisabeth A. Lloyd eds., 1992).
78. THE OLYMPIC CHARTER § 14.
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even intelligence. Rather, the term can usefully be thought of as re-
ferring to how well an individual "fits" its environmental condi-
tions.79 Were we forced to face the conditions that face the common
earthworm, it would be more "fit" than we.
The following parable (which happens to be true) may be useful
in thinking about what fitness is and what it is not. We mammals
evolved at about the same time as dinosaurs.80 While Tyrannosaurus
rex and his kindred stomped, roared, and dominated, our Mesozoic
ancestors attempted to live quiet and unobtrusive lives. Most were
very small-about the size of a mouse.8 1 Most dinosaurs, however,
were much larger.82 By any measure, they were citius, altius, for-
tius; we were not. Yet we survived, and they did not. Why is not
clear; nor would the same answer necessarily be relevant today. (I
discuss the epistemology of fitness further below.) But as the loud,
the rude, and the powerful dominate today's public discourse, even
as we are tempted to envy and emulate them, we should remember
the parable's conclusion: We survived and they did not.
Two further implications of my theory merit note. First, it is es-
sential that any species, culture, or other group subject to evolution
be able to evolve. The conditions we face are constantly changing; a
group unable to adapt to those changes will eventually perish. The
ability to evolve is therefore itself adaptive. It follows that, for ex-
ample, protection of a freedom to explore new ideas and behaviors,
implemented in the United States through the First Amendment and
rules protecting individual autonomy, is adaptive and therefore
79. The most common conception of fitness in philosophical literature fo-
cuses on traits that contribute to viability, fertility, and overall ability to leave
offspring within a particular environment. See Beatty, supra note 77, at 115-
16. The definition offered in the text is, I believe, consistent with this.
80. See generally MESOZOIC MAMMALS: THE FIRST TWO-THIRDS OF
MAMMALIAN HISTORY (Jason A. Lillegraven et al. eds., 1979) (discussing the
evolution of mammals); Timothy Rowe, Phylogenetic Systematics and the
Early History of Mammals, in MAMMAL PHYLOGENETIC: MESOZOIC
DIFFERENTIATION, MULTIBERCLUATES, MONOTREMES, EARLY THERIANS, AND
MARSUPIALS 129 (Federick S. Szalay et al. eds., 1993) (examining phyloge-
netic systematics to understand mammalian evolution).
81. See MESOZOIC MAMMALS, supra note 80, at 2-4.
82. See id. at 2. Tyrannosaurus rex weighed six tons or more; an adult
Compsognathus, the smallest known dinosaur, weighed one to two kilograms.
See 17 THENEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 322 (1998).
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normative. Second, speedier evolution is itself adaptive. In general,
the faster a group can adapt to new conditions, the more likely it will
be able to survive and reproduce. Learned behaviors can evolve
much faster than genetically determined ones. This is why human
biology makes extraordinary sacrifices to permit learning and ex-
plains the adaptive advantage of intelligence.
83
B. Articulating an Intergenerational Objective
It is not the purpose of this Article to justify the foregoing the-
ory of motivation and normative obligation; I reserve that task for
another day. Here, I ask the reader to accept the theory arguendo
and propose instead to explore its implications for intergenerational
equity.
Within my taxonomy, the most fundamental intergenerational
question---"What normative obligations do we owe to future genera-
tions?"-is not an ethical question at all. The principle of reciprocity
operates in very limited ways between generations. Caring for the
elderly makes sense in part because the continued ethos of such care
makes it more likely that we will be cared for in turn as we age-an
implementation of the Golden Rule. 84 We apologize for past wrongs
as a way of signaling our intention to cooperate in the future.85 Apart
from these and a few other discrete behaviors, little of what we
commonly refer to as "intergenerational ethics" is subject to the prin-
ciple of reciprocity. Regardless of how we behave, our descendants
will not be able to reward or retaliate against us effectively.86 More
fundamentally, implicit in any invocation of the principle is the
premise that our well-being is as important as anyone else's. From
83. I explore these premises at greater length in my forthcoming article.
See Seto, supra note 1. For our purposes here, one important consequence is
that behavioral evolution may now be much more important for humans than
genetic evolution.
84. See, e.g., Peter Laslett, Is There a Generational Contract?, in JUSTICE
BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 24, 28 (Peter Laslett & James S.
Fishkin eds., 1992).
85. See, e.g., George Sher, Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights, in JUSTICE
BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 48, 48 (Peter Laslett & James S.
Fishkin eds., 1992).
86. See Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin, Introduction: Processional Jus-
tice, in JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 1, 1, 7 (Peter Las-
lett & James S. Fishkin eds., 1992).
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pages that follow, however, is that this seemingly simple-minded
premise has profound implications, fully consistent with both our
most ethical intuitions about how we should behave towards others
and our most spiritual yearnings for a life rich in meaning-
something close to Aristotle's version of eudaimonia (loosely trans-
lated, "flourishing" or "fulfillment"). 89 Because evolution is often
viewed as adverse to religion (or at best irrelevant to it) and because
I hope to persuade not merely the secular, I will go further and re-
state my aspiration in a vocabulary not commonly used in law re-
views. Those of you who believe in God, I hope, will conclude that
the image I paint of the future and our obligations towards it are fully
consistent with faith-that one might readily believe that God wants
such an outcome, has built the processes that will lead to it into the
mathematics of the universe, and rejoices as we discover and under-
stand them.
Having now perhaps promised more than I can deliver, I turn to
the implications of this premise for intergenerational decision mak-
ing. I will address three questions. (1) First, what does this premise
imply about the relationship between the present and the future?
Cost-benefit analysis, as I noted at the outset, typically treats the pre-
sent as most important and the future of diminishing importance as
one moves away from the present.90 Does evolutionary theory re-
quire a different stance? (2) Second, what group or groups in the fu-
ture should we be motivated to help survive and reproduce? A
common answer is that we should care about members of the species
homo sapiens-in other words, that the boundary of our species de-
fines the boundary of our normative obligations. This answer,
that, on average, we humans are stubbornly and unrealistically optimistic. See
Larry Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk, Duress, and Cog-
nition, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 71, 149-50 (1998) (reviewing empirical literature
on this issue); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Se-
riously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 654-55
(1999) (reviewing empirical literature on this issue). This implies that some
detachment from the truth may actually be adaptive.
89. See ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE's EUDEMIAN ETHICS 14, 48-52, 93-101
(Michael Woods trans., 1982) ("activity of a complete life in accordance with
complete virtue"); THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note
2, at 44 ("human flourishing"); ANTHONY KENNY, THE ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS
190-214 (1978) ("the good life").
90. See Symposium, supra note 24.
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an evolutionary perspective, however, our well-being is irrelevant;
all that is important is whether we survive and reproduce into the fu-
ture. Using the Golden Rule to protect present well-being against
claims by future generations is precisely what we should not be do-
ing. In my view, therefore, attempting to characterize the fundamen-
tal intergenerational problem as one of equity-attempting directly to
apply, for example, Rawlesian theory87 or the Golden Rule-is an
invitation to conceptual confusion. By this, I do not mean we can
ignore the future. A group, culture, or species that ignores the future
is less likely to have one. Caring about the future is one of the most
adaptive motivations a culture can foster. It is intensely normative.
But it does not in and of itself involve "ethics"--that is, it does not
involve the principle of reciprocity.
Under my theory, a claim that a behavior is normative is neces-
sarily a claim that it is adaptive. It follows, therefore, that what mat-
ters-indeed, all that matters-is that we survive and reproduce into
the indefinite future. This is, after all, the only unimpeachable test of
adaptivity. Within my taxonomy, this is a normative assertion: I am
asserting that we should internalize behaviors that will maximize the
likelihood that we survive and reproduce. Concretely, we should feel
a compulsion to perform such behaviors and should teach our chil-
dren and pupils to feel discomfort if they fail to perform them.
Admittedly, at first blush, this premise may sound bleak. Re-
gardless of how persuasive evolutionary theory may seem to scien-
tists and their intellectual kin, the notion that survival and reproduc-
tion are all that matter will evoke from many the plaintive query, "Is
that all there is?" Even if the evolutionary story is true, perhaps a
different story would be more inspiring, more fun, more meaningful,
perhaps even more adaptive. 88 What I hope to persuade you in the
87. Rawls' own treatment of this problem is one of the less satisfactory por-
tions of this theory ofjustice. See RAWLS, supra note 61, at 284-93.
88. Truth is generally adaptive because it permits us to learn and deal effec-
tively with the world. But absolute truth is not necessarily required. It is said
that pessimists are more often right, but optimists more often get things done.
See, e.g., Hiram E. Chodosh, Reflections on Reform: Considering Legal Foun-
dations for Peace and Prosperity in the Middle East, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 427, 438 (1999) (quoting the Russian proverb: "There are two kinds of
people in the world: optimists and pessimists. But actually everyone is an op-
timist; pessimists just have more information."). There is substantial evidence
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however, becomes increasingly problematic as we look further into
the future. If nothing else, unless we intervene, our species will
evolve into something else, as will all the various cultures to which
we now belong. Looking to the very long run, if we sacrifice to
make the future possible, we will likely benefit beings very different
from ourselves, who may not care about any of the things we hold
most dear. Our answer to this second question, therefore, cannot be
arbitrary; it must justify those sacrifices. (3) Third, within the very
serious limits of what is knowable about the future, what kinds of
choices can we realistically make to maximize the likelihood that the
group selected in answer to our first question will survive and repro-
duce? Some have argued that we know so little about the far future
that we should effectively ignore it in practical decision making.91
Axe they right?
1. Relationship between present and future
There is only one adaptive and therefore normative answer to
my first question: The future always matters more than the present.
Indeed, the present matters only because it makes the future possible.
Consider two groups. Members of the first live happy, productive
lives; assume, however, that because of the choices that make such
lives possible the group will become extinct at some point in the fu-
ture-say 1,000 years. Members of the second group live more self-
sacrificing lives; assume that as a result the group will survive in-
definitely. The fact that the first group is happier or better off today
is completely irrelevant from an evolutionary perspective, since it
does not contribute to the long-term survival and reproduction of the
group. On these facts, all else being equal, the only adaptive and
therefore normative choice is that made by the second group. And
this is true regardless of how much happier or better off members of
the first group may be in the interim.
This conclusion stands in stark contrast to that normally urged
by utilitarians and implemented by cost-benefit analysis.92 The ethi-
cal attraction of utilitarianism derives from the equality of ethical
91. See Cowen & Parfit, supra note 31, at 144-59 (analyzing and criticizing
temporal restrictions on social discount rates).
92. See generally Boudreaux, supra note 23, at 125-68 (discussing cost-
benefit analysis).
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status implicit in the principle of reciprocity. 93 If we are all equal, it
reasons, the welfare of each of us is equally important. Our norma-
tive objective, therefore, should be to maximize the sum of such wel-
fares. Utilitarianism has many problems, which I do not propose to
rehearse here.94 It does differ, however, in two particularly impor-
tant regards from my approach. First, it assumes that welfare is addi-
tive-that is, that the happiness of two is twice as important as the
happiness of one. The problem with this assumption is that the re-
peated Prisoner's Dilemma is a two-person game. The fact that any
two players must be of equal ethical status in their adaptive bilateral
relationship does not necessarily imply that it is adaptive to assign
two players twice the ethical status of one. Our understanding of
multiplayer repeat games is poor,95 but it is perfectly conceivable
that such games may have nonadditive ethical implications. If so,
the founding ethical premise of utilitarianism is false.
A second problem with utilitarianism is not as fundamental, but
does invalidate most common approaches to its implementation. The
present is finite; the future infinite. If we simply aggregate welfare,
therefore, the utilitarian calculus implies that the future is infinitely
more important than the present.96 Utilitarians are apparently uncom-
fortable with this conclusion. Applying the Golden Rule between
generations, as utilitarians implicitly do, necessarily involves some
effort to protect each generation against undue claims by another.
The conclusion that we in the present have no normative standing
vis-4-vis the future (although we may have standing among our-
selves) seems inconsistent with this effort. Utilitarians commonly
solve this problem by assigning lower ethical status to future genera-
tions-each generation's status being lower than its parent's.9 7 This
takes advantage of the mathematics of limits, reducing the infinite
future to a finite quantity. The mechanism most commonly used to
93. See RAWLS, supra note 61, at 138.
94. See, e.g., THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 2,
at 824-25.
95. See generally, TAYLOR, supra note 53, at 82-108 (giving an excellent
introduction to the problem of multiperson games).
96. This is so because mathematically any infinite amount is infinitely lar-
ger than any finite amount.
97. See id.
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perform this task, of course, is the positive discount rate. 98 This so-
lution, however, is inconsistent with the ethical core of utilitarianism
itself. Either generations are of equal ethical status, or they are not.
If they are not, as the solution assumes, then utilitarianism has denied
its own ethical foundation.
99
2. What group should we be motivated to help
survive and reproduce?
One might expect evolutionary theory to answer this question by
asserting that each of us should care about his own closest genetic
relatives and no one else-which I will label the "Hitler Principle"
after one of its most famous exponents. Adolf Hitler urged his fol-
lowers to care only about "Aryans," whom he characterized as his
and their genetic kin, and, at the extreme limits of his ideology, to
exterminate all others.100 If all that matters is whether genes survive
and reproduce, we should care most about those who carry our
genes. Hitler's answer is inconsistent with evolutionary theory,
however, for several reasons.
First, it is at variance with actual behavior. Mother Theresa
should not exist; nor should the young soldier who gives her life to
save her comrades and therefore never reproduces; nor should the
decedent who leaves her money to charity rather than to grandchil-
dren; nor even should the husband and wife who consciously decide
not to have children. We expect gaps between actual and adaptive
behavior, but genes that cause a failure to reproduce ought to be
washed out of the pool very quickly. No purely genetic explanation
of such very common nonreproductive behavior is likely to satisfy;
and once we seek explanations elsewhere, there is no particular rea-
son to expect that genetic kin should be specially favored.
Second, the Hitler Principle is inconsistent with the principle of
reciprocity. If I care only about my kin and you only about yours,
we are likely to be in continuous conflict. The theory of repeat
98. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 53, at 144-61.
99. I do not mean by this to imply that discount rates can never have an ap-
propriate role in decision making. Further discussion of their possible appro-
priate use appears below.
100. See, e.g., IAN KERSHAW, HITLER 1889-1936: HUBRIS xxiv-xxx (1999);
IAN KERSHAW, HITLER 1936-45: NEMEsis 495 (2000).
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games tells us that such conflict is not adaptively optimal.' 0' In other
words, the Hitler Principle is not merely evil; it is a poor long-term
evolutionary strategy. It therefore cannot be normative.
If any remain unconvinced, the following thought experiment
further illustrates this point. Assume that Hitler had won and applied
the Hitler Principle rigorously, exterminating all losing peoples and
thereby furthering the survival and reproduction of the winners-
"Aryans," Italians, and Japanese. His approach would next have re-
quired that the Aryans exterminate their allies since, of course, the
survival of those groups would have conflicted with the ultimate ge-
netic domination of the Aryans. Aryans consist of yet further genetic
subgroups. The approach would then have required that each at-
tempt to exterminate all others. Taken to its logical conclusion, in
fact, it requires the elimination of all except a single breeding couple.
Once that couple produces descendants, it requires that the process of
exterminations then begin again. Indeed, there is no natural stopping
point for the exterminations required if one seriously cares only
about one's own. Needless to say, a world of constant attempted ex-
termination is unlikely to be adaptive.
Third, a norm that focuses solely on one's own descendants to
the exclusion of all others ignores the mathematics of sexual repro-
duction. Because we do not reproduce by cloning, our genetic con-
tribution to descendants declines by a factor of two every generation.
Thus, the first generation of descendants carries one-half of our
genes, the second one-quarter and so on. Assuming no inbreeding,
the nth generation carries only (1/2)n of our genes. If we further as-
sume four generations per century, any given individual's genetic
contribution to descendants living 1,000 years from now will be less
than one-trillionth.10 2  Even if we assume substantial inbreeding
among our descendants, but assume at least a moderate amount of in-
terbreeding between ethnic subgroups, the chances of a particular
human 1,000 years hence having more genes from me than from you
in any meaningful sense are insignificant.
More intuitively attractive is the possibility that our normative
obligations should be directed towards the future of the human
101. See TAYLOR, supra note 53.
102. At twenty generations, of course, the assumption of no intermarriage
between descendants becomes highly improbable.
264
November 2001] AN EVOLUTIONARYPERSPECTIVE
species as a whole. Here, my response is more nuanced: This may
be temporarily plausible, but is not inherently true in the long run.
To explore this issue, it is necessary once again to return to basics.
Why should I care about the progeny of someone I do not know and
will probably never meet, simply because she is human? For such
caring to be normative, it must be adaptive. Why, then, might such
caring be adaptive?
Biology offers one answer, kin selection, 0 3 which ultimately
proves inadequate. I do not propose here to review the theoretical
underpinnings of kin selection. Its relevant premise, however, is that
we are motivated to care about others because we share genes with
them. If this premise is carried to its logical conclusion, the strength
of our motivation to care should depend on the extent to which we
share genes. Thus, we should care more about our children than
about our cousins, more about our cousins than about strangers, and
more about strangers than about nonhumans. Initially plausible, on
closer examination this answer fails. My wife, for example, is a ge-
netic stranger to me, yet I care more about her than about my cousins
(sorry, cousins). And there are many sacrifices I make daily for my
dogs that I do not normally volunteer to make for random human
strangers.
Not only does kin selection fail to explain many of our day-to-
day ethical priorities, it also implies larger-scale normative orderings
that do not match our intuitions. Species, of course, evolve. We are
no exception. Assume that time has passed and that 2% of the ge-
netic material in humans has changed. In other words, assume that at
some point in the future, our descendants share only 98% of their ge-
netic material with today's homo sapiens. Assume further, if it mat-
ters, that because of these changes we and these future humans (had
we a time machine) would not be able to interbreed. Should we still
care about their fate? I assert that we do and should. Yet these hy-
pothetical descendants are no more closely related to us than today's
103. On the theory of kin selection, see ELLIOTr SOBER, THE NATURE OF
SELECTION: EVOLUTIONARY THEORY IN PHILOSOPHICAL Focus 335 (1984);
GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, NATURAL SELECTION: DOMAINS, LEVELS, AND
CHALLENGES 19-21 (1992); Egbert Giles Leigh Jr., Levels of Selection, Poten-
tial Conflicts, and Their Resolution: The Role of the "Common Good", in
LEVELS OF SELECTION IN EVOLUTION 15 (Laurent Keller ed., 1999).
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chimpanzees, with whom we share 98.4% of our genetic material and
with whom we also cannot interbreed.1
0 4
These future humans are, of course, our descendants, and per-
haps that should make a difference (in other words, perhaps the Hit-
ler Principle, in this attenuated form, is well taken). Consider, how-
ever, the following variation on the preceding hypothetical. Assume
that at some point humanity has evolved into two species. Each
shares 98% of its genetic material with the other; each shares sub-
stantial genetic material with today's humans as well. Assume fur-
ther, if it matters, that neither group can interbreed with the other. I
have asserted above that we do and should care about the fate of each
of these two groups. But should each care about the other's? Most
of us would answer that they should. They are, after all, sibling spe-
cies of which ours is the parent. But, of course, they stand vis-d-vis
each other in exactly the same genetic relationship as we stand with
today's chimpanzee. We too are sibling species of which some other
species, now extinct, was the parent. Indeed, most biologists believe
we are sibling species with every other species of living thing on this
planet, descended from a common ancestor. Yet, few give other spe-
cies ethical standing, and those who do rarely measure the quantity
of that standing by reference to the degree of each species' genetic
relatedness to humans. Common descent does a poor job of explain-
ing our normative preferences.
Focusing exclusively on genes also ignores the importance of
learned behaviors. At the risk of oversimplification, behavioral kin
selection is analogous to genetic kin selection, positing that we are
motivated to care about others because we share learned behaviors
with them. If we are going to accord kin selection an explanatory
role, we cannot ignore its behavioral aspect. After all, we generally
do care more about those with whom we share learned behaviors
than those with whom we do not. For example, most Americans are
104. See JARED DIAMOND, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE: THE EVOLUTION AND
FUTURE OF THE HUMAN ANIMAL 23 (1992). Detailed comparison of a sam-
pling of genes from the two species suggests that the genetic distance between
humans and chimpanzees is only twenty-five to sixty times greater than that
between Caucasian, Black African, and Japanese populations. See EDWARD 0.
WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE 25 (1978) (citing Mary-Claire King & A.C.
Wilson, Evolution at Two Levels in Humans and Chimpanzees, 188 SCIENCE
107-16 (1975)).
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either immigrants or descendants of immigrants and, therefore, more
closely genetically related to many in their countries of origin than to
at least some other Americans. Yet, we commonly identify far more
strongly with such other Americans than with our genetic cousins in
our respective countries of origin. This is because Americans share a
common pool of learned behaviors.
Jonathan Swift neatly framed the tension between genetic and
behavioral affiliation in his book Gulliver's Travels.10 5 He postu-
lated two species, Yahoos and Houyhnhnms. The first were geneti-
cally human but behaviorally animal (and apparently incapable of
changing); the second were genetically horselike but behaviorally
human-civilized in every European regard. Assume that you are
called upon to choose which of these two species will survive to suc-
ceed humanity. You may choose only one. Many of us, I suspect,
would choose the Houyhnhnms, from which I infer that many of us
identify more strongly with our behavioral, than with our genetic,
heritage.1
0 6
Ignoring such outlandish hypotheticals, of course, most today
would still view the species boundary as a reasonable boundary for
normative obligation. The reason, however, has nothing to do with
genetics. It is rather the result of an historically temporary coinci-
dence: Our species boundary currently coincides with the boundary
of our broadest commonly accepted We. No mainstream philosopher
currently argues that this We-the set of actors to whom we owe at
least some ethical duty-should be any smaller than all of human-
ity. °7  A few philosophers, Peter Singer most prominently, now
105. Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels, in 36 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 1, 135-84 (Robert Maynard Hutchinson et al. eds., Encyclo-
pedia Britanica Inc. 19th prtg. 1971) (1952).
106. The line between behavior and genetic evolution is fuzzy at best. At
least some biologists argue that an organism's behaviors must be treated as
part of that organism, not merely as something external. See J. SCOTT
TURNER, THE EXTENDED ORGANISM: THE PHYSIOLOGY OF ANIMAL-BUILT
STRUCTURES 1-2 (2000); see also Michael LaBarbera, Fuzzing the Boundary of
Animal Life, 289 SCIENCE 1882, 1882 (2000). For a systematic discussion of
how behavioral and genetic evolution interact, see WILLIAM H. DURHAM,
COEvOLUTION: GENES, CULTURE, AND HUMAN DIVERSITY (1991).
107. See Peter Singer, Ethics and the New Animal Liberation Movement, in
IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 1-2 (Peter Singer ed., 1985)
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argue that our We should be larger, but this view is still regarded as
avant-garde.1
08
I take no position as to the appropriate size of our We. What I
do assert is that if we use the species boundary to define the scope of
our normative obligations, we do so not because there is any norma-
tive magic about the possibility of interbreeding. 10 9 We do so, rather,
because the species boundary and the boundary of our broadest We
happen to coincide. This may or may not change; hypotheticals in
which it does are still largely the province of science fiction, not
practical public policy. We may discover that we are not the only in-
telligent species in the universe. We may create artificially intelli-
gent beings with whom we share an ethos of reciprocity. We may
uplift dolphins or chimpanzees to become our intellectual and social
equals. Or Peter Singer may persuade us to include other species in
our We without any such genetic changes. If any of these events
come to pass, our We should and probably will expand. My argu-
ment does not depend on any of these events being likely. It is sim-
ply that the set of actors we do and should care about is our We, not
our species.
It is for this reason that I care about the hypothetical human I do
not know and will probably never meet; she is part of my acknowl-
edged We. It is for this reason that we typically care more about our
spouses than about our genetic cousins---our spouses form part of a
narrower and more intense We. In the hypothetical above, in which
humanity splits into two species, it is for this reason that we believe
members of those two species should care about each other's fates;
we are merely asserting that the two should form a common We. It
is for this reason that many of us would choose Houyhnhnms over
108. See id. at 6-10.
109. Inability to interbreed between otherwise closely related groups may
result, at least initially, from signaling problems. Every species has its own
conventional mating signals. These signals are in many ways arbitrary-
analogous to our agreeing to drive on a particular side of the road. For most
purposes, it really does not matter what the signals are, so long as everyone in
the group uses and interprets them correctly. As the mating signals in different
subpopulations of a single species evolve, different subpopulations may end up
with different signals. They then become effectively incapable of interbreed-
ing. See Megan Higgie et al., Natural Selection and the Reinforcement of Mate
Recognition, 290 SCIENCE 519, 519-20 (2000).
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Yahoos; it is easy to imagine sharing an ethos of reciprocity with the
former. The Yahoos, by contrast, are incapable of internalizing any
such ethos.
3. Making choices within the limits of what is known and knowable
The final question I propose to address is this: Within the very
serious limits of what is knowable about the future, what kinds of
choices can we realistically make to maximize the likelihood that our
We will survive and reproduce? The epistemological problem is
even more profound than is commonly appreciated. The amount of
information in the universe is beyond comprehension. To process it
fully would require a machine the size of the universe; indeed, the
universe can be thought of as just such a machine. No smaller proc-
essor-and I refer in particular to the human brain-is capable of
such a task.
Even small parts of the universe can be unbelievably complex.
Ecosystems, for example, are notoriously difficult to analyze, even
after the fact. Consider, for example, the recent near extermination
of the northern Pacific sea otters and devastation of the kelp beds in
which they live. 110 Sea otters are among the few documented tool-
using mammals and therefore behaviorally among our closest kin.
Scientists studying the problem hypothesize the following causal
chain. (1) Small increases in ocean temperatures (2) reduced the
amounts of food available for the species of fish on which seals and
sea lions feed. (3) Populations of those species then plummeted, (4)
as did those of seals and sea lions. (5) Killer whales, who had previ-
ously fed almost exclusively on seals and sea lions, were forced to
find a different food source: sea otters. (6) As a result, sea otter
populations declined by more than 90%; in the open ocean they were
almost completely eradicated. (7) Sea otters feed on sea urchins; sea
urchin populations therefore mushroomed. (8) Sea urchins feed on
kelp; the kelp beds then disappeared."'
110. See J. A. Estes et al., Killer Whale Predation on Sea Otters Linking
Oceanic and Nearshore Ecosystems, 282 SCIENCE 473, 473-75 (1998); David
L. Garshelis & Charles B. Johnson, Other-Eating Orcas, 283 SCIENCE 175,
175 (1999).
111. See Jocelyn Kaiser, Sea Otter Declines Blamed on Hungry Killers, 282
SCIENCE 390, 390 (1998).
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Ascertaining "fitness" is subject to all these epistemological
problems. It is difficult to predict in advance that species of kelp that
taste good to sea urchins will be less "fit" if ocean temperatures rise
slightly, as recent history apparently reveals.' 12 The same predictive
problems arise in any similarly complex system-they arise, for ex-
ample, in determining whether any given behavior will "fit" a given
culture. The classic algorithms of deductive and inductive logic do
have important roles to play. From the fact that a stranger was killed
by a car in another city, we can generalize that it may be dangerous
for us to play in the street; generalization permits learned behaviors
to evolve more quickly and therefore permits us to adapt more
quickly to changing conditions. But deduction and induction merely
accelerate the evolution of learned behaviors. In the face of informa-
tion overload, evolution is the only known process reliably capable
of identifying optimal results. It is how nature designs kelp; in hu-
man society, it determines whether behaviors succeed or fail; in eth-
ics, it helps us identify the paths of righteousness.
If we accept the foregoing, it follows that logic cannot specify
the one true path to a normatively successful future. Unlike utilitari-
anism, which purports to set forth a logical algorithm for determining
that path, evolutionary theory says, in effect, "We're just going to
have to wait and see what actually works," a posture likely to frus-
trate lawyers, judges, philosophers, and others who prefer argument
to experimentation. What we can do in advance, however, is to de-
fine roughly the regions within which that path must lie. Outside
those regions, success is unlikely. Within them, we will use intelli-
gence to accelerate the process of learning from failures and suc-
cesses.
What can we realistically know about the long-term fate of our
We and what does that knowledge imply about our normative obliga-
tions? First, we know it is normative to seek the indefinite survival
of our We. A culture in which survival of the We is not normative is
less likely to survive. This proposition may sound trivial; it is not.
Most importantly, it means that numbers, in and of themselves, do
not matter. More bodies are not necessarily better. Our We may, in
fact, be more likely to survive indefinitely if our numbers remain
112. See id.; see also Estes et al., supra note 110, at 474-75.
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moderate, thereby freeing at least some members of the We to pro-
vide more effectively for the future. Although the principle of recip-
rocity requires that we count existing lives lost as costs in cost-
benefit analysis or any other mode of long-term planning, this means
that lives foregone are not subject to the same requirement. Existing
lives are necessarily part of our We; lives foregone are not, and
should not be."
3
Second, we know it is normative to hope for our We's continu-
ing evolution." 4 By this, I do not mean to invoke any notion of
"progress." Rather, I mean to suggest that, through evolution, we
continue to survive and reproduce by adapting to changing condi-
tions or adapting more effectively to existing conditions. A species
or society that does not evolve will not succeed in the long run. For
utopians, the implication is profound: A static utopia is inherently
maladaptive and therefore cannot be normative. But effective evolu-
tion is not inevitable. It is therefore normative to seek to create the
conditions for effective evolution. Behavioral evolution operates
much more quickly than genetic evolution. For this reason, my
analysis will focus primarily on decisions we can make today to fos-
ter the future evolution of learned behaviors.
Behavioral evolution requires diversity." 5 An intolerant, mono-
lithic culture is less able to respond to changing conditions or even to
adapt optimally to existing ones. Far from endorsing a sterile, unidi-
rectional society, therefore, an evolutionary normative stance en-
courages cultural richness and variety. Integrative expansion of the
We, discussed below, itself makes the learned behaviors carried by
113. I do not here mean to address the abortion controversy in any way.
Clearly, pro-life advocates include embryos and fetuses in their We's, and I do
not contend that such inclusion is wrong. By "lives foregone" I mean solely
lives that never come into being; I do not mean to address the question of when
this occurs.
114. My conclusions in this regard are consistent with Braybrooke's. See
David Braybrooke, The Social Contract and Property Rights Across the Gen-
erations, in JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 107, 111-12
(Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds., 1992) (arguing that prior generations
may not block the revision of rights).
115. This is certainly true in biological ecosystems. The ability of biological
ecosystems to adapt to stress depends in significant part on the diversity of its
species' responses to environmental fluctuations. See Editor's Choice, 290
SCIENCE 233, 233-35 (Gilbert Chin ed., 2000).
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members of the We more diverse, pushing us to develop new imple-
mentations of the principle of reciprocity to accommodate our differ-
ences.
Behavioral evolution also requires continuing experimental ex-
ploration of behavioral and ethical possibilities. For this purpose, we
often use simulation. Fiction, for example, allows us to explore how
behaviors and ethics work at relatively low personal cost. So do
movies and television. So do the kinds of thought experiments we
are commonly asked to perform in school, church, temple, or
mosque. A society without these institutions would be substantially
less adaptive. Indeed, much of what makes life stimulating and
meaningful is essential to the evolution of learned behavior and
therefore to the long-term survival of our We. It may also make us
happy. But under my theory the pursuit of happiness is actually
more important than happiness itself.
Third, if we find ourselves in potential friction with individuals
who are not members of our We, we know that it is almost always
adaptive to develop an ethos of reciprocity with Them-a process I
label "integrative expansion." Expansion of the We, of course, can
also be achieved through conquest; conquest, however, almost al-
ways fosters hierarchy, which is in turn inconsistent with the princi-
ple of reciprocity. For this reason, integration is by far the preferable
route to expansion. The boundaries of our We, unlike those of our
species, are dynamic. Prior to the nineteenth century, international
law reflected primarily an ethos of reciprocity between sovereigns;
its We included only states in the European sense. The past century
has witnessed the beginnings of an ethos of reciprocity between peo-
ples, and all peoples of the world are now included in our largest
commonly accepted We. This transformation has occurred, my the-
ory suggests, because it is adaptive. Part of our normative mandate
is continually to search for more effective implementations of the
principle of reciprocity, at all levels, and in the process to expand our
ethical horizons to include any with whom we would otherwise be in
potential friction.
It follows that in the long run, use of the species boundary to de-
fine the boundaries of our We is likely to become unsatisfactory.
Science fiction often portrays galactic societies in which humans
form merely one part of a larger We. One can even imagine a
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scenario in which, like the soldier who gives her life for her com-
rades, the human species sacrifices itself for this larger We. Were
we to do so, I suggest, our deaths would be no more in vain than that
of the heroic soldier. The We would survive, and with it our behav-
ioral and ethical legacy.
In sum, we know enough to conclude that our long-term objec-
tive should be the survival, evolution, and integrative expansion of
our We. Admittedly, this objective is consistent with many possible
paths; it therefore does not identify any One True Path. It does,
however, exclude important possibilities. It excludes static, intoler-
ant, or culturally homogenous paths. It excludes paths in which only
our genetic kin matter. It excludes paths ultimately inconsistent with
the principle of reciprocity.
There are other important things we already know that may and
should affect our long-term planning. We know that some factors
that contribute to our survival and reproduction are subject to com-
pound growth. Information-the inventory of our learned behav-
iors-appears to be one such factor. Physical capital, to the extent it
does not deplete resources, is another. In making decisions with re-
gard to such factors, the use of positive discount rates may be adap-
tive. This is so because the more we have of such factors today, the
more we will have in the future. Importantly, positive discount rates
are thus not justified because they maximize current preference satis-
faction, but rather because they contribute to the future."
6
There are, however, factors not subject to compound growth-
most obviously nonrenewable resources like oil, soil, and biodiver-
sity. If we use a liter of oil to make a hula hoop today, that liter will
not be available millennia hence for perhaps more essential purposes.
The principal argument in favor of ignoring the problem of depletion
relies on technological substitution. The argument asserts or as-
sumes that technology will provide economically viable substitutes
for anything we use up at least as fast as we use it up. History, how-
ever, does not tend to support any such assumption. Iraq, after all,
116. The problem of ascertaining optimal discount rates is beyond the scope
of this Article. The problem is further complicated by the game theoretic in-
sight that lower discount rates make long-term cooperation more likely and
higher rates, conversely, less likely. See TAYLOR, supra note 53, at 81.
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was once called the "Fertile Crescent"; it is no longer.17 Jared Dia-
mond hypothesizes that after serving as the cradle of civilization,
Iraq first fell behind southern Europe, then northern Europe, then
North America, each in turn depleting essential resources and
thereby slowing its further development.1 18  The original Native
Americans were unable to find a technological substitute for the
horse.l19 Madagascar is currently suffering horrible soil erosion.
20
Once that soil is gone, technology is unlikely to be able to replace it
in the foreseeable future. If we render our planet uninhabitable, it is
unlikely that technology will offer an economically viable substitute.
The adaptive use of factors not subject to compound growth
therefore cannot be determined solely using positive discount rates.
This is because positive rates focus on the present, and the present,
from an evolutionary perspective, is only important insofar as it
makes the future possible. How we should use factors not subject to
compound growth is less clear. Arguably, we should generally only
use them in sustainable ways. We should only deplete them if there
is reason to believe that the resulting net benefit to the future will
outweigh the future cost. Neither reliance on free markets, nor the
administrative application of cost-benefit analysis using positive dis-
count rates will lead to such optimal use. This is knowable today.
We know something else as well: Existing ecosystems work. If
we intervene in an ecosystem, even with the best intentions, we do
not know whether the modified ecosystem will work at all. In other
words, we lack information, but our ignorance is asymmetric. His-
tory tells us that changing ecosystems generally results in reduced
biodiversity. 12 1 Extinctions occur quickly. Biodiversity, by contrast,
takes eons to develop.122 To the extent that ecosystems are potential
resources, their destruction is warranted only if the resulting net
117. Seeid. at 135,410-11.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 358-59.
120. See Rosanne Model, Comment, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Environmental
Investments Using Taxpayer Funds Without Adequate Remedies for Expropria-
tion, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1195, 1206 (1991).
121. See F. Stuart Chapin III et al., Consequences of Changing Biodiversity,
405 NATURE 234, 234-41 (2000).
122. See Editor's Choice, 290 SCIENCE 1465, 1465-67 (Stella Hurtley ed.,
2000).
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benefit to the future will outweigh the future costs. This determina-
tion may be difficult, but the fact of the matter is that it will be made,
and we know that free markets cannot correctly make it.
I therefore challenge any contention that we do not know
enough about the far future to justify action to protect it. Based
solely on current knowledge, we know a lot about what we should
and should not do. Those that we should do are normative not be-
cause we prefer them, as utilitarians assume; they are normative in
and of themselves. We prefer them, if we do, because our behavioral
cultures are adaptive. Preference satisfaction itself, however, will
not always be consistent with adaptivity. Where it is not, interven-
tion is likely to be adaptive and therefore justified.
III. CONCLUSION
Recall that the purpose of this paper is not to justify the theory
outlined in Part II.A. Its purpose is rather to put that theory to work
to address the question: "What normative obligations do we owe to
future generations?" I promised in my introduction to identify a
long-term normative objective consistent with both evolutionary the-
ory and our intuitions about ethics. I believe I have done so. Our
prime normative obligation is to facilitate the survival, evolution,
and integrative expansion of our We. This is not, per se, an ethical
objective-that is, it is not a direct corollary of the principle of recip-
rocity. It is, rather, an adaptive and therefore normative objective,
implicating the principle of reciprocity only because that principle is
itself adaptive.
The obligation I have identified is, I assert, consistent with our
intuitions about ethics and our need for meaning. It tells us that we
must seek the good. We must perfect our implementation of the
good. We must build bridges to others. We must try to understand
how the world works. We must be tolerant of diversity. We must be
open to the new. In short, normative evolutionary theory does not
endorse simple-minded answers like the Hitler Principle; its answers
instead look far more like Aristotle's eudaimonia. The vision I have
described is, moreover, fully consistent with many, if not most, va-
rieties of religious faith. Evolutionary theory, it turns out, encour-
ages us to flourish, not for our own sake, but to make possible some-
thing much larger than ourselves.
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I return, finally, to the Pleistocene Dilemma. I ask you to as-
sume that our decision maker knows no more about her future than
we know about ours, but that she understands the theory set forth in
this paper and endorses its normative conclusions. Her objective will
be the survival, evolution, and integrative expansion of her We. She
will therefore care about her descendants, even twelve millennia later
and even knowing that their values and behaviors are likely to have
radically changed. Indeed, she will encourage such change. Among
her hopes for her far descendants is that they will be strong enough
to contribute relatively equally to a joint We should they encounter
others. But in any event, she will strongly prefer that her We not be
annihilated. She will attempt to use available resources in a sustain-
able way so as to minimize the likelihood that their depletion will
close off options. And she will therefore choose to limit hunting.
